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Abstract 
 In 2010 the Louisiana legislature adopted the Louisiana Granting Resources and 
Autonomies for Diplomas (GRAD) Act, a statewide performance-based funding policy designed 
to improve performance among public colleges. This study, utilizing data collected from the 
Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) on 15 two-year public colleges over 
eight years, applied Generalized Least Squares (GLS) regression to retention rates, graduation 
rates, and degree productivity. Results suggest that the introduction of the policy had little 
immediate effect on overall institutional performance; however, there were some modest 
increases in long-term certificate productivity. Additionally, there were significant improvements 
in data quality throughout higher education after the introduction of the policy. 
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1 
Introduction 
 Funding for higher education in Louisiana has never been robust. In fact, it wasn't until 
the 2007-2008 fiscal year that the state finally caught up to the Southern regional average in per 
student funding (Blum 2010b; Public Affairs Research Council, Inc. 2008). Unfortunately soon 
after, the state suffered one economic blow after another: the 2008 recession hit, newly 
implemented tax breaks caused income tax revenues to shrink, and Hurricane Katrina recovery 
funds and federal stimulus dollars began running out and/or expiring (Ballard 2010; Blum 2011; 
Russell 2016). Postsecondary institutions in Louisiana faced a unique dilemma. They not only 
had to contend with dwindling state support for higher education, as many states had been 
dealing with for several years, but they were also not able to generate new revenue since 
Louisiana requires a two-thirds legislative approval to increase tuition, the only state in the 
Union to do so (Blum 2010a). 
 By 2010, state support for colleges and universities had fallen almost 20%, with 
additional cuts looming on the horizon (Blum 2010a). Since the colleges were not in a position 
to cover the losses of the state allocation by raising tuition on their own, they were forced to 
depend on the governor to help fill the budget holes. During the regular legislative session, 
Louisiana governor Bobby Jindal attempted to address the current budget climate of reduced 
funds for higher education by backing House Bill 1171. The bill, later Act 741, resulted in the 
Louisiana Granting Resources and Autonomies for Diplomas (GRAD) Act. The GRAD Act, 
signed into law in June 2010, instituted performance measures for the colleges that, if met, 
allowed them to increase their own tuition by up to 10% per year. Additionally, this newly 
created performance-based funding formula tied 15% of a college’s overall state funding to 
meeting the GRAD Act goals (Addo 2012). 
 Although similar performance-based funding policies had been implemented in states 
such as California, Florida, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington 
with limited success, several influential organizations, many powerful state leaders, and the 
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public were in favor of having colleges’ budgets tied to performance, obviously believing that 
doing so would increase graduation rates and make the colleges more accountable (Blum 
2010b; Hillman 2016; Hillman, Tandberg, and Fryar 2014; Shuler 2010). Groups such as 
Blueprint Louisiana, Public Affairs Research Council, and GNO, Inc. touted the policy as the 
remedy to Louisiana’s pitiable graduation rates. At the time, Louisiana colleges graduated only 
38% of first-time, full-time bachelor degree students within six years, second-to-last in the 
Southern region (Blum 2010c). The colleges, specifically, were interested in gaining the 
autonomy to raise their own tuition, believing it to be a way to cure the ills of the recent state 
budget cuts (Blum 2010b; Addo 2013c). In due course, the Board of Regents signed six-year 
agreements with individual institutions in which they committed to meeting specific performance 
objectives in exchange for authority to increase tuition up to 10% for the following academic 
year. 
 However, public opinion quickly turned. In a letter to the editor, one educator made clear 
that he felt the whole scheme was a farce and that it was simply “an attempt to give the 
appearance of reform to an ideological agenda that consisted of little more than removing 
hundreds of millions of dollars from a higher education system that already was drastically 
underfunded” (Striffler 2012). Soon, the colleges also became disgruntled. Apparently, the 
reporting process alone consisted of almost 52 different performance benchmarks (Addo 2012). 
The hurried implementation of the Act and the associated tedious reporting requirements, a 
common complaint amongst institutions in states with performance-based funding policies, 
resulted in state auditors finding much of the colleges’ data fraught with errors (Addo 2012; 
Lipinkski 2014; The Advocate 2013). In fact, the first audit of GRAD Act data in 2012 revealed 
13 out of the 32 undergraduate institutions reviewed had submitted data that were ‘not 
sufficiently reliable’ (Louisiana Legislative Auditor 2012). 
 The crux of the problem was that the colleges were not actually benefiting from all of the 
extra work. It seemed that the Act was not about increasing performance or autonomy, but 
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about mediating cuts to higher education imposed by the state. Evidence of this can be seen as 
early as 2010 when in response to questions by state lawmakers on the true state of higher 
education funding, the governor’s office asserted that the overall funding for colleges and/or 
universities had only been slashed by five percent because tuition hikes resulting from colleges 
meeting the GRAD Act minimum requirements filled the gaps created by the most recent budget 
cuts (Ballard 2010). This trend of replacing state appropriation funding with increased tuition and 
fees continued. Since 2009, postsecondary institutions in Louisiana have seen their portion of 
core revenue from state appropriations fall 30% while their percentage of net revenue from 
tuition and fees grow 97% (see figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: 2006-2015 % of Core Revenue--State Appropriations versus Tuition & Fees 
 
 
Source: State Higher Education Executive Officers Association 
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4 
what effect this experiment in performance-based funding had on higher education in Louisiana. 
So far, we know that the colleges saw their tuition increases swallowed up by additional cuts in 
state funding--essentially making them a wash--and students, over the last five years, had their 
tuition and mandatory fees increase faster than in any other state (Millhollon and Addo 2013; 
Russell 2016). Obviously, a deeper examination of the effects of the Act is required to discover 
if colleges were able to improve performance, as had been portrayed as the original purpose of 
the Act, or if it had simply been political rhetoric in order to stave off complaints about funding. 
Through this study, I attempt to examine not only if institutions improved performance, but also 
what external factors may have contributed to their gains and/or losses.   
 
5 
Literature Review 
 Performance-based funding has existed for the better part of a century. It began when 
an amendment to the National Security Act of 1949 introduced performance budgeting to the 
U.S. military. The policy was quickly expanded, through the Budget and Accounting Procedures 
Act of 1950, to include all federal civilian governmental agencies (Jordan and Hackbart 1999; 
McLendon, Hearn, and Deaton 2006). Researchers contend that governments use this method 
of funding, predicated on meeting certain performance measures, to influence behavior and 
pressure institutions to be more accountable, efficient, and productive in the use of publicly 
generated funds (Alexander 2000; Bogue and Johnson 2010; Burke and Associates 2002; 
Dougherty et al. 2011; Fryar 2011; Layzell 1998; Liefner 2003). The reliance on performance 
outcomes would imply that there is a “massive effort to reform government to become more 
rational, professional, democratic, authoritative, and honest” (Miller, Robbins, and Keum 2007, 
473). Purportedly hoping to achieve the same ends, a majority of state-level agencies, including 
higher education, likewise adopted the system. 
 However, many argue that performance-based funding is a much more complicated 
issue and that other factors including politics, the economy, and timing all play a significant role 
in a state’s decision to adopt the program (Burke and Minassians 2003; McLendon, Hearn, and 
Deaton 2006; McLendon, Hearn, and Mokher 2009; Melkers and Willoughby 1998; Tandberg 
2009; Tandberg and Griffith 2013). Actually, some question whether these ‘reforms’ are only 
symbolic and are instead simply a way in which to manipulate the budget process (Fryar 2011; 
Liefner 2003; Miller, Robbins, and Keum 2007; Rabovsky 2012). In fact, “although most states 
claim both public accountability and institutional improvement as purposes of performance 
funding, in some, increased funding seems a critical, although usually unannounced, motive” 
(Serban and Burke 1998, 160). 
 The use of performance-based funding (PBF) in higher education began in 1978 when 
“the State of Tennessee first addressed systemized accountability by establishing a series of 
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performance or incentive funding initiatives that began shaping a portion of the higher education 
funding structure based on measurable outcomes” (Alexander 2000, 420). This experiment 
opened the door for other states to implement their own versions in which achievement of 
performance measures was directly tied to specific amounts of funding (Burke and Minassians 
2003; D’Amico et al 2014; Friedel et al. 2013). In the early to mid-1990s this funding model, now 
referred to as PBF 1.0, was expanded to states such as Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Kentucky, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Ohio, and South Carolina with varying degrees of success. In fact, 
Arkansas, Colorado, Kentucky, Minnesota, and others quickly either ceased the program 
altogether or completely revamped it (Burke and Associates 2002; Dougherty and Natow 2009; 
Friedel et al. 2013; Hermes 2012; Miao 2012). In the PBF 1.0 model, performance funding 
existed as bonuses or incentives awarded on top of the usual enrollment-based state funding. 
Most of these models concentrated on the use of outcome measures such as degrees awarded, 
graduation rates, and time to degree completion with little regard for differences between or 
among types of institutions (Dougherty et al. 2011; D’Amico et al. 2014; Friedel et al. 2013; 
Serban and Burke 1998). In most cases, both four-year and two-year schools were held to 
similar, if not the same, performance indicators. 
 Recently, budgetary constraints and the expanding appeal of accountability have 
renewed interest in performance-based funding (Dougherty and Reddy 2011; Hermes 2012; 
Kelly and Jones 2007; Rabovsky 2012; Rutherford and Rabovsky 2014). After years of 
insufficient gains under PBF 1.0, many states have moved toward an updated model, so called 
PBF 2.0, in which the focus has been shifted to include intermediate measures of success as 
relates to the mission of individual institutions. Indicators like retention rates, transfers, and 
course completions have been included alongside two-year specific measures such as post-
graduate job placement, transfer articulation agreements, and success in remedial course 
progressions (Bogue and Johnson 2010; D’Amico et al. 2014; Dougherty et al. 2011; Friedel et 
al. 2013; Mangan 2015). With PBF 2.0, funds are now tied to actual state allocations wherein 
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which schools that do not meet their required performance levels can be penalized with a 
reduction in state-level funding. 
 By the beginning of 2016, at least 30 states had instituted some form of performance-
based funding for higher education (Mangan 2015; Supriano 2016). Past research has indicated 
that performance-based funding is predicated on the belief that in times of scarce resources 
institutions will alter their behavior in order to increase resource acquisition. If this were true, 
then it would intuitively follow that providing colleges additional financial incentives based on 
increased performance during times of economic constraint would result in institutional 
improvements (D’Amico, et. al. 2014; Schmidt 2002; Titus 2006). In other words, we would 
expect to see increases in student outcomes. Unfortunately, research has not shown this to be 
the case (Hillman 2016). 
 Much of the research related to performance-based funding policies has concentrated 
on their impact on graduation rates, retention, and degree completions. These studies have 
tended to rely upon several types of comparative research methods in investigating the 
effectiveness of these policies. Some have utilized a difference-in-differences Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) estimation strategy to compare student performance changes over time in the 
treatment group (states/institutions effected by PBF policies) to changes over time in the control 
group (states/institutions not effected by PBF policies) while others have employed Hierarchical 
Linear Modeling (HLM) to explore performance growth patterns in states with PBF against those 
without. These panel data analysis methods assist the researcher in evaluating whether 
improvements in performance by the treatment group can be attributed specifically to the 
implemented policy or if some other reason is behind the change. Several recent studies using 
these techniques have found that PBF policies have not positively impacted graduation rates at 
four-year institutions (Fryar 2011; Rutherford and Rabovsky 2014; Sanford and Hunter 2011; 
Shin 2010; Shin and Milton 2004). Other national and some state-level (Tennessee and 
Washington) studies conducted on retention found similar results at both four-year and two-year 
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schools (Hillman, Tandberg, and Fryar 2015; Rutherford and Rabovsky 2014; Sanford and 
Hunter 2011). However, there have been more varied findings related to degree completions. 
While no increase in bachelor degree productivity has been found (Hillman, Tandberg, and 
Gross 2014; Rutherford and Rabovsky 2014; Umbricht, Fernandez, and Ortagus 2015), some 
impact on associate degree and certificate completions at two-year institutions have been 
discovered (Hillman, Tandberg, and Fryar 2015; Tandberg, Hillman, and Barakat 2015). After 
the implementation of performance-based funding policies, some states have seen gains, 
though delayed, in associate degree and short-term certificate attainment. 
 While recent research on performance-based funding has not shown that opportunities 
for increased resources directly equal improved student outcomes, there have been some 
findings that the model has led to enhancements in other areas. Although evidence was 
minimal, Rabovsky (2012) discovered that those institutions subject to performance funding 
requirements were more likely to prioritize spending toward instruction. One of the most lauded 
benefits of the introduction of performance-based funding has been the change in focus of 
conversation and institutional efforts away from simply increasing enrollment to improving 
outcomes (D’Amico et al. 2014; Hillman, Tandberg, and Gross 2014; Mangan 2015; Sanford 
and Hunter 2011). Under these models, colleges are required to prepare and report on 
performance measures; thus, providing transparency within the institution and the community. 
These documents can be used as internal tools for administrators and faculty in decision-
making and strategic planning and/or as external tools for students and public officials in 
evaluating institutional performance and responsiveness to regional workforce needs. 
 Some have suggested that it is not the model itself that should be blamed for the 
lackluster performance results but instead the minimal amount of funding to which it is tied 
(Layzell 1998; Miao 2012). This common flaw is supposedly a reason why performance funding 
has not made the level of impact touted as possible by its proponents. As Burke and Associates 
(2002) acknowledged, “campus leaders will support programs that may produce more money, 
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but their enthusiasm wanes when the funding falls below expectations” (226). Enough funding 
must be at risk to incentivize colleges to alter behaviors and change long-standing systems 
(Burke and Associates 2002; Hermes 2012; Hillman, Tandberg, and Gross 2014; Layzell 1998; 
Maio 2012; Rutherford and Rabovsky 2014; Sanford and Hunter 2011). Unfortunately, the 
perfect level of funding at which motivation kicks in is unknown. 
 During the almost forty years in which performance-based funding has been in 
existence, funding levels have varied anywhere from 1% to 100% (D’Amico et al. 2014; Friedel 
et al. 2013; Maio 2012; Schmidt 2002). On average, higher education performance-based 
funding, whether in the form of bonuses or portions of state allocations, has hovered around five 
percent (Mangan 2015; Sanford and Hunter 2011; Supriano 2016). When Tennessee first 
began its program in the late 1970s, funding consisted of a two percent budget supplement. By 
2005, when the state switched away from a traditional PBF 1.0 model to the more progressive 
PBF 2.0 version, the budget supplement had only reached a high of 5.45% (Sanford and Hunter 
2011). In their in-depth study on the impacts of performance funding in Tennessee, Sanford and 
Hunter (2011) tried to discern whether this increase in the level of funding had motivated 
institutions enough to do more to advance student success. They found no substantial changes 
in institutional behavior or performance. They concluded that an amount greater than 5.45% 
was needed to increase outcomes. Amazingly, even in states with well established programs 
such as Washington and Pennsylvania, state allocation funds tied to performance max out at 
one percent and eight percent, respectively, although researchers, in both cases, have found 
that these amounts were not enough to produce significant results (Hillman, Tandberg, and 
Fryar 2015; Hillman, Tandberg, and Gross 2014). More recently, there have been efforts in 
states such as Louisiana (15%) and Arkansas (25%) to increase performance funding to a more 
meaningful level (Callaway 2012; Friedel et al. 2013). 
 At the other end of the spectrum, several states have moved to tie almost all of their 
higher education funding to performance. One of the first states to experiment with this model 
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was South Carolina. In 1996, legislation was instituted that required 100% of a school’s state 
allocation be based on meeting specific benchmarks (Schmidt 2002). This experiment was 
quickly abandoned after only two years, having only managed to reach a maximum level of 38% 
in just one of those years (Dougherty et al. 2011). This failure did not stop others like Ohio and 
Tennessee from establishing similar performance models. Both now require up to 80% of higher 
education state funding be based entirely on meeting certain performance levels (Friedel et al 
2013). Unfortunately, not enough time has elapsed since these more extreme performance-
based funding policies were implemented for studies to have been conducted on their impacts. 
 Several researchers have cautioned against this rush toward putting such a large 
percentage of state funding at risk. Although many agree that funding levels should be enough 
to incentivize institutions to increase performance, some worry about creating an unstable 
funding system in which basic services are in jeopardy and long-term planning is impossible 
(Dougherty and Reddy 2011; Hermes 2012; Maio 2012; Shin and Milton 2004). In actuality, 
almost all of the state-level performance-based policies contain stopgap measures to prevent 
any wild fluctuations in funding. Examples of these safeguards include employing hold-harmless 
clauses that guarantee a minimum amount of base funding each year, utilizing three year rolling 
averages to prevent any one year of down performance from disrupting operations, and setting 
benchmarks at levels that are easily reachable (Dougherty et al. 2014; Rabovsky 2012; 
Umbricht, Fernandez, and Ortagus 2015). The risk faced by schools is reduced even further by 
the fact that, in most states, the current percent of core revenue institutions received from state 
funding is shrinking (Alexander 2000; Dougherty et al. 2011; Dougherty et al. 2014; Tandberg 
and Griffith 2013; Titus 2006). These seemingly large percentages actually end up having 
minimal impact on annual budgets. Furthermore, states have been hesitant to enforce the 
punitive powers allowable under their performance-based funding policies (Dougherty et al. 
2011; Jordan and Hackbart 1999; McLendon, Hearn, and Mokher 2009; Tandberg 2009). 
Legislators are very aware of the political risks if they defund a prized institution or one with 
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powerful supporters. Seemingly, the effects of these policies have been mitigated to have little 
to no real consequences.  
  
 
12 
Theoretical Expectations 
 The real question remains, to what extent does performance-based funding actually 
impact institutional performance? The available empirical work provides limited theoretical 
guidance on which to build hypotheses. We know that studies have found no evidence of 
increased graduation rates at bachelor degree granting institutions in states with performance-
based funding policies (Fryar 2011; Rutherford and Rabovsky 2014; Sanford and Hunter 2011; 
Shin 2010; Shin and Milton 2004). Regrettably, since no similar studies have been conducted 
on graduation rates at two-year schools, we have no indication of whether the policy has 
comparable effects on associate degree granting institutions. Likewise, research has found that 
performance funding has had no positive impact on student persistence or retention rates at 
either four-year or two-year institutions (Hillman, Tandberg, and Fryar 2015; Rutherford and 
Rabovsky 2014; Sanford and Hunter 2011). However, recent studies on performance funding 
and degree completions have begun to yield more varied results. While bachelor degree 
productivity has not grown, there has been some evidence of increases in associate degrees 
and short-term certificates in states with performance funding (Hillman, Tandberg, and Fryar 
2015; Hillman, Tandberg, and Gross 2014; Rutherford and Rabovsky 2014; Tandberg, Hillman, 
and Barakat 2015; Umbricht, Fernandez, and Ortagus 2015). Unfortunately, these results have 
only been found in single state case studies so their generalizability is limited. 
 While most studies concentrate on the limited impact that these funding policies have on 
increasing institutional effectiveness, some showcase which aspects of policy design have 
helped to produce the greatest benefit. The most successful policies offer opportunities for 
adequate input from related stakeholders, differentiate measures between and among two- and 
four-year colleges in consideration of their diverse missions, set reasonable benchmarks, and 
provide sufficient funding and guidance to assist institutions in building the organizational 
capacity needed to increase performance (Burke, Modarresi and Serban 1999; D’Amico et al. 
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2014; Dougherty et al. 2011; Friedel et al. 2013; Schmidt 2002; Serban and Burke 1998; Shin 
2010; Titus 2006; Whissemore 2012). 
 As research continues to be conducted on performance-based funding, I have to ask 
myself what I can contribute to the ever-growing literature. As Serban and Burke (1998) declare, 
longitudinal studies of institutional performance are the best devices for understanding 
performance-funding effectiveness. I believe that an examination of the GRAD Act provides this 
opportunity. The case of performance-based funding in Louisiana is unique. Not only did the 
GRAD Act tie 15% of a college’s state allocation to performance, it also gave schools the 
autonomy to raise tuition up to 10% without prior approval from the legislature. Previous studies 
on performance-based funding have not considered this added incentive as a factor in 
determining the effectiveness of these policies. Additionally, this study will be one of the first to 
explore the relationship between performance-based funding and graduation rates at two-year 
institutions. Through this analysis of measures related to institutional effectiveness, I may be 
able to draw some conclusions as to whether the GRAD Act accomplished its stated intentions 
of improving higher education performance. Prior research detailing the limited impact of 
performance-based funding policies and the perceived design flaws of the legislation, 
specifically the absence of adequate funding to build organizational capacity, lead me to 
hypothesize that the GRAD Act did not increase the overall effectiveness of Louisiana’s public 
post-secondary two-year institutions. I do not expect to find any improvements in graduation 
rate, retention, or associate degree completions, but I do anticipate some gains in short-term 
certificates as these provide schools with the simultaneous benefit of helping to meet award 
productivity benchmarks and increasing revenue. 
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Research Design 
 Hearn (2006), in an essay prepared for the 2006 National Postsecondary Education 
Cooperative Symposium, observed that early studies of performance-based funding relied on 
simple descriptive and/or correlational analyses. He suggested that in the future, researchers 
and policymakers should try to “untangle what is merely artefactual and what is truly an effect of 
some program or policy” (17). Recently, we have seen an increase in quantitative studies such 
as those by Shin (2010); Sanford and Hunter (2011); Fryar (2011); Rabovsky (2012); Hillman, 
Tandberg, and Gross (2014); Hillman, Tandberg, and Fryar (2015); and Umbricht, Fernandez, 
and Ortagus (2015) that aim to understand not only if the presence of a performance-based 
funding model improves institutional effectiveness, but also what external factors may intercede. 
In contrast to many previous studies conducted at the macro-level (state or national); Hillman, 
Tandberg, and Fryar (2015) reveal that utilizing a micro-level approach in studying the Student 
Achievement Initiative in Washington allowed them to explore more deeply how the 
performance-based funding policy impacted individual institutions. I believe that the same 
approach is appropriate for studying the GRAD Act. 
 It is important to note, “quality--the hallmark of higher education--is an elusive and 
subjective attribute that is seldom easy to assess objectively and always difficult to measure 
quantitatively” (Burke and Associates 2002, 40). In evaluating performance relative to the GRAD 
Act requirements, the Louisiana Board of Regents utilized common measures based on student 
success, articulation and transfer, workforce and economic development, and efficiency. Some 
of the specific indicators included first to second year retention rate, same institution graduate 
rate, award productivity, change in program completers, placement rate of graduates, and 
number of accredited programs. Over the course of the six-year agreements the type and 
weight of indicators utilized in the calculations by the Board of Regents were altered. These 
inconsistencies limit the usability of the GRAD Act reports as functional tools of comparability for 
the state in evaluating the true impact of the policy. In consideration of this, a string of 
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unflattering data audit reports, and the need for data from before the implementation of the 
GRAD Act, I chose to seek out a single source, the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data 
Survey (IPEDS), for the outcome data for my research. IPEDS has routinely been used as a 
consistent and reliable source of postsecondary data (Fryar 2011; Hillman, Tandberg, and Fryar 
2015; Kelly and Jones 2007; Rabovsky 2012; Shin 2010; Shin and Milton 2004). 
 In this study, institutional effectiveness will be operationalized through three performance 
indicators: retention, graduation rate, and award productivity. By including an intermediate 
measure (retention) alongside conventional output measures (graduation rate and award 
productivity), I hope to expand on the current research dedicated to discovering the level to 
which performance-based funding policies impact institutional effectiveness. Specifically, I will 
explore how the GRAD Act affected part-time and full-time student retention rates, graduation 
rates, the total awards given, and the number of associate degrees and/or certificates conferred 
by conducting a longitudinal (panel) time-series analysis based on data from 15 two-year public 
undergraduate institutions over eight academic years. This time span includes years from both 
before and after the implementation of the GRAD Act. This sub-group of two-year colleges 
shares similar, in some cases identical, missions, admission policies, and funding structures. 
Additionally, their regional focus will allow me to discover if local demographics and/or the state 
of the area public school system affected college performance. Narrowing my research to 
concentrate on members of this homogenous group will allow me the opportunity to discover 
and draw more general conclusions on how the autonomies granted in the Act impacted this 
specific sector of higher education. 
 The unit of analysis will be institution by academic year. Each school will be categorized 
according to its accrediting body: Council on Occupational Education (COE) or Southern 
Association of Colleges and Schools Commission on Colleges (SACSCOC). COE adheres to 
the mission of “assuring quality and integrity in career and technical education” (Council on 
Occupational Education website). This organization accredits schools that seek to expand the 
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portability of skill-based credentials, increase job placement for their graduates, and explore 
linkages with business and industry. The mission of SACSCOC is more general in nature. It 
prefers to focus on the “enhancement of educational quality…and the improvement of the 
effectiveness of institutions by ensuring that they…address the needs of society and students” 
(Southern Association of Colleges and Schools Commission on Colleges website). Schools 
accredited by SACSCOC offer bachelor degrees, associate degrees, certificates, and continuing 
education programs as well as curricula that are transferable to other colleges and universities. 
 
Table 1: Institutions Categorized by Accrediting Body 
SACSCOC   COE 
   
Baton Rouge Community College  Capital Area Technical College 
Bossier Parish Community College  Central La Technical Community College 
Delgado Community College  Northshore Technical Community College 
Fletcher Technical Community College Northwest Louisiana Technical College 
Louisiana State University-Eunice*  South Central La Technical College 
Nunez Community College  SOWELA Technical Community College 
River Parishes Community College   
South Louisiana Community College   
Southern University at Shreveport*   
SOWELA Technical Community College**  
  
*Junior colleges. **SOWELA became accredited by SACSCOC in 2014 
 
 
 
 The Louisiana Community and Technical College System manage all schools within the 
study except Louisiana State University-Eunice and Southern University at Shreveport. 
Although these institutions are accredited by the same body as community colleges and offer 
programs and services normally associated with comprehensive two-year schools, I suspect 
that these ‘junior colleges’ may act differently. In order to test this supposition, I will run two 
versions of each proposed regression model--one that categorizes these two schools as 
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community colleges and one that categorizes them as junior colleges. Any inconsistencies 
found may provide evidence that institutions not identified as ‘community colleges’ react 
differently to policy changes, at least in this scenario. 
 Seven measures related to student success will be used to determine institutional 
effectiveness: graduation, part-time retention, full-time retention, short-term certificate 
productivity, long-term certificate productivity, associate degree productivity, and total awards 
productivity (see Appendix A for definitions). The dependent variables for retention and 
graduation will be the rates for each as calculated by IPEDS for an academic year. I will apply a 
generalized least squares (GLS) random-effects regression model to each measure. Random-
effects GLS is appropriate for longitudinal panel data as it takes into account the correlation that 
usually exists between repeated observations on the same subject rather than assuming 
independence among all observations. It also allows for estimates to be calculated for important 
time-invariant independent variables such as GRAD Act and accrediting body. I employ a 
slightly different methodology for award productivity. As the number of awards varies so widely 
across years and within categories, I will attempt to standardize the measure by having each 
related dependent variable be a dummy variable indicating whether a statistically significant 
increase in performance occurred from the previous year (1=Yes, 0=No). I will apply a GLS 
logistic regression model to each of the binary dependent variables.  
 Graduation rate data for the 2008 academic year are unavailable for several institutions 
from the New Orleans area. A graduation cohort could not be established for the 2006 academic 
year because these institutions were either closed or exempt from the Integrated Postsecondary 
Education Data Survey (IPEDS) reporting requirement due to Hurricane Katrina. As such, the 
graduation rate analysis will begin with the 2009 academic year instead of 2008 as with the 
other dependent variables. Additionally, I have chosen to differentiate between the total number 
of awards and the total number of associate degrees and short- and long-term certificates 
because of recent findings by Hillman, Tandberg, and Fryar (2015). They discovered that policy 
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changes related to performance-based funding in Washington caused a significant increase in 
the number of short-term certificates awarded but not an increase in associate degrees or long-
term certificates. In order to understand the true impact of the GRAD Act, I will explore 
performance related to these individual outcomes. 
 The main Independent variable of interest is the GRAD Act. This measure will be a 
dummy variable indicating whether the GRAD Act was in effect during a specific academic year 
(1=Yes, 0=No). Although the legislation was signed into law in June 2010, institutions were not 
required to meet established performance measures until 2011-2012. As such, the 2012 
academic year will act as the first year in which the variable will equal 1. Also, variables related 
to institutional characteristics will be used as controls. These include full-time equivalent 
enrollment, which should mediate any uptick in award productivity simply due to enrollment 
increases; full-time and part-time enrollment rate; full-time, part-time, and total white enrollment 
percentage; percentage of revenue from tuition & fees; percentage of revenue from state 
appropriation; percentage of expenses on instruction; percentage of expenses on 
student/academic support; and accrediting body. Evidence suggests that since 2012 the student 
body composition at two-year colleges has altered somewhat because increases in admission 
requirements and steep tuition hikes have forced many students that would have otherwise 
attended four-year universities to enroll at a two-year college (Russell 2016). Since all schools 
across the state were simultaneously affected by these student population changes, I am 
assuming that this change was random and will not systematically impact the findings. Finally, 
as studies by Dougherty, et al. (2016); Kelly and Jones (2007); Hillman, Tandberg, and Fryar 
(2015); and Rutherford and Rabovsky (2014) have shown, regional socio-economic factors may 
also influence institutional performance. This design includes such regional factors as median 
household income, white population percentage, and K-12 school district performance score as 
additional controls.  
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 It is important to note that this study has limitations in regards to available data and 
breadth of scope. Some of the data in my analysis are based only on full-time, first-time 
students. This is unfortunate as there is some discussion that this “emphasis on full-time 
students in many of the indicators, probably due to data availability, slights the growing 
importance of part-time students, especially in urban institutions and two-year colleges” (Burke 
1998, 60). In a 2013 article, University of Louisiana System President Sandra Woodley echoed 
this sentiment. She argued that “schools that cater to low-income and so-called non-traditional 
students--older and oftentimes holding down full-time jobs--should not be judged using the 
same measures as a school that attracts high-achieving, middle-class students straight out of 
high schools” (Addo 2013b). An example of this can be found in the current graduation rate data 
available from IPEDS. These calculations do not include transfer, returning, or part-time 
students. These omissions obviously limit the use of this measure as a true barometer of 
institutional effectiveness. However, including these data alongside retention rates and award 
productivity should help to create a fuller picture of the performance level of the two-year 
institutions included in the study.  
 Also, it is very likely that an examination of student outcomes other than those included 
in this paper could yield very different results. Future research should explore the impact of 
alternative performance goals such as job placement rates, number of transfer students, or 
changes in program completers. Additionally, inferences to be drawn from this study on the 
impact of the GRAD Act on institutional effectiveness are limited by its focus on two-year 
institutions and the finite number in each category. This analysis includes only 15 institutions: 
six technical colleges, seven community colleges, and two junior colleges. Finally, it may be 
possible that other events occurring during the same time as the implementation of the GRAD 
Act could have interceded to either augment or disrupt the policy’s effects. Events such as 
changes in board leadership, technical college mergers, and continuing state-level budget 
struggles may all have played a part in school performance.  
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Findings  
Institutional Characteristics 
 I began my analysis by exploring the average values of various institutional 
characteristics both before and after the implementation of the GRAD Act. I looked at how these 
variables changed when considering all two-year schools as a whole, then by separating them 
into three distinct categories: technical colleges, community colleges, and junior colleges (see 
table 2). I started by comparing differences in enrollment. I found that FTE (full-time equivalent) 
enrollment increased from 2374.6 to 3006, but the increase was not found to be significant. Of 
the three types of institutions, community colleges routinely maintain the largest FTE enrollment, 
but only technical colleges experienced a statistically significant increase. I believe this change 
is due more to the ongoing mergers of individual sites into single data-reporting technical 
colleges than a genuine increase in student enrollment. In fact, since 2012 student headcount 
across all two-year institutions has decreased 13.3% (Louisiana Board of Regents). 
 Little substantial change in the proportion of full- and part-time enrollment was found. 
The average percentage of full-time enrollment declined from 46.4% to 45% while the 
percentage of part time enrollment increased from 53.6% to 55.1%, but neither difference was 
statistically significant. Likewise, none of the three types of institutions saw any real variation in 
full- or part-time enrollment. One area that did experience unexpected change was the 
percentage of white student enrollment. White student enrollment decreased from 55% to 
47.6% (t=2.65, p≤.01) across all two-year colleges while technical colleges and community 
colleges, specifically, experienced a decline of 7.5 percentage points (t=2.12, p≤.05) and 8.9 
percentage points (t=3.21, p≤.01), respectfully. Junior colleges also saw a decline in white 
enrollment, but the difference was not statistically significant.  
 Trends in state appropriations and tuition and fees revenue were as expected. On 
average, the percentage of core revenue from state funding decreased from 40.2% to 30.8% 
(t=4.83, p≤.001) as income from tuition and fees increased from 12.8% to 19.5% (t=-4.23, 
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p≤.001). Similar results were found when I examined differences in revenue source per FTE. 
After adjusting for inflation, I discovered that revenue from tuition and fees grew by $556 per 
FTE while revenue from appropriations fell by over $1473 per FTE. Even though the typical two-
year college had increased their tuition and fees 119% since 2008, it still was not enough to 
offset the decline in state support. Extraordinarily, there were schools such as Northshore 
Technical Community College and Capital Area Technical College that actually experienced a 
250% increase in tuition during this time span (see Appendix C: Supplemental Table 1). 
 Interestingly, while examining revenue sources at the institutional level, I found a distinct 
disparity in the extent to which the different types of schools were dependent on the state for 
funding. In the years after the implementation of the GRAD Act, community colleges and junior 
colleges saw their portion of core revenues from state appropriations dwindle to 24.9% and 
24.5%, respectively, while technical colleges derived 40.5% of their revenue from state funds. 
Initially I surmised that this may be a result of the greater amount of revenue that community 
and/or junior colleges could garner from separate sources such as grants, gifts, investments, 
etc. that may not be open to technical colleges. However, I found that in every year except 
2011, technical colleges received substantially more state funding per FTE than did either 
community colleges or junior colleges. Unfortunately, as the formula for state appropriations, 
including the 15% supposedly tied to performance, is tangled up into layers of state and local 
politics, I could not determine the reasons as to why funds were distributed in this manner.  
 Evidence suggests that the implementation of the GRAD Act did not influence two-year 
colleges to increase the proportion of their budget spent on instruction. There were no 
significant differences for any of the three types of institutions, although on average, technical 
colleges utilized at least 10 percentage points more of their budgets toward instruction than 
either community colleges or junior colleges. However, a review of FTE expenses on instruction 
revealed a different picture. Expenditures per FTE actually fell from $4474 to $4081 (t=1.69, 
p≤.05). This same trend was seen at all levels, but the greatest decrease occurred at the 
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technical colleges. They cut spending on instruction by over $490 per FTE. Even with this 
reduction, technical colleges still consistently spent more than community colleges and only fell 
slightly below junior colleges in three out of the eight years. 
 Opposite results were found when I explored expenses on student support services. The 
overall percentage of expenses for support increased from 14.5% to 17.8% (t=-2.60, p≤.01). 
Although all three types of institutions increased their budget percentages for supportive 
services, only technical colleges saw a statistically significant increase. Still, I found that actual 
changes in expenses per FTE were minimal. No substantial differences were found at any 
institutional level, though junior colleges unfailingly outspent either of the other two categories. 
These results are consistent with previous findings that PBF caused limited change in 
expenditure habits of effected colleges (Rabovsky 2012; Kelchen and Stedrak 2016). 
Retention Rate 
 Before the GRAD Act average full-time retention was 52.4%, but after implementation 
the rate fell to 51.7%. No significant difference was found between the two rates. Likewise, full-
time retention remained relatively flat at each of the three types of institutions.  However, some 
improvements were found in part-time retention. Overall, mean part-time retention increased 
from 38.5% to 43.5% (t =-2.08, p≤.05). While technical colleges experienced a 13.3 percentage 
point (t =-3.21, p≤.01) increase, community colleges and junior colleges saw little to no change. 
Although this increase suggests a correlation between the GRAD Act and part-time retention, I 
believe this change is more reflective of the types of awards usually conferred by technical 
colleges and the way in which retention is measured. Retention rate data drawn from IPEDS 
include both students that re-enrolled from the prior year and those that completed their 
program. As technical colleges tend to issue more one-year or less certificates than other types 
of institutions, their retention rates may be inflated simply because of their larger cohort. I 
imagine if IPEDS only included students that re-enrolled at the same institution in their definition 
of retention, the technical college rates would not have increased so substantially. 
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Table 2: Mean Value (SD) of Institutional Characteristics Before (2008-2011) & After (2012-2015) GRAD Act 
 Technical Colleges Community Colleges Junior Colleges 
 2008-2011 2012-2015 2008-2011 2012-2015 2008-2011 2012-2015 
       Full-time Retention 
Rate 
56.6 (9.2) 54.9 (10.0) 49.9 (5.0) 49.8 (4.5) 47.9 (3.3) 49.3 (4.0) 
Part-time Retention 
Rate 
36.4 (10.6) 49.7* (17.1) 37.6 (14.3) 37.9 (6.3) 48.3 (15.8) 46.0 (6.5) 
Graduation Rate 44.2 (9.8) 49.1 (14.6) 8.6 (5.4) 13.1* (6.9) 10.0 (3.8) 12.0 (3.0) 
Total awards per  
100 FTE 
145.9 (219.6) 132.4 (81.8) 26.6 (24.0) 44.4* (33.6) 14.8 (1.7) 17.6* (1.3) 
FTE enrollment 1068.1 (638.4) 1635.4* (359.4) 3684.3 (3222.4) 4347.3 (3520.6) 2037.3 (250.5) 2085.3 (274.8) 
% Full-time 
enrollment 
42.8 (17.6) 37.3 (11.8) 47.0 (7.6) 47.6 (10.3) 55.1 (5.1) 57.4 (10.5) 
% Part-time 
enrollment 
57.2 (17.6) 62.7 (11.8) 53.0 (7.6) 52.4 (10.3) 44.9 (5.1) 42.6 (10.5) 
% White enrollment 55.8 (12.8) 48.3† (11.8) 58.3 (10.2) 49.4† (10.4) 41.4 (27.9) 39.1 (30.9) 
% Revenues from 
state funds 
46.9 (8.9) 40.5† (8.8) 36.0 (8.3) 24.9† (6.9) 33.0 (10.9) 24.5† (5.1) 
% Revenues from 
tuition & fees 
6.9 (3.3) 12.6* (7.4) 18.1 (7.7) 25.5* (6.3) 13.3 (6.5) 17.8 (11.0) 
% Expenses for 
instruction 
48.1 (3.9) 50.4 (6.0) 38.8 (8.8) 40.9 (7.1) 34.0 (14.7) 34.5 (17.7) 
% Expenses for 
student support 
10.1 (1.2) 14.9* (6.5) 16.7 (5.0) 18.5 (6.1) 20.8 (9.4) 23.5 (11.9) 
              
Note: Graduation rates were not available for 2008.  
*Increase found at p≤.05. †Decrease found at p≤.05.
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 Random-effects generalized least squares (GLS) regression was applied to retention 
rates. Retention rates are based on the percentage of the fall full-time or part-time cohort of first-
time degree/certificate-seeking students from the prior year that re-enrolled or successfully 
completed their program by the following fall. Two models each were used for both full-time and 
part-time retention, one that separated institutions into only two categories: community college 
and technical college and a second model that further differentiated the institutions into three 
categories: community college, technical college, and junior college. 
 
Model 1: y=B0 +B1lnfenroll (lnpenroll) +B2fwhite% (pwhite%) +B3rstate% 
+B4rtuition% +B5einstruc% +B6esupport% +B7lnreg_income 
+B8reg_white% +B9zreg_score +B10tech +B11grad_act +ui 
 
Model 2: y=B0 +B1lnfenroll (lnpenroll) +B2fwhite% (pwhite%) +B3rstate% 
+B4rtuition% +B5einstruc% +B6esupport% +B7lnreg_income 
+B8reg_white% +B9zreg_score +B10junior +B11grad_act +ui 
 
Model 1, depicting the impact of the GRAD Act on full-time retention rates, was found to be 
statistically significant (Wald chi2(11)=35.41, p≤.001). The regression output (see table 3) 
revealed only one significant predictor at p≤.05: percentage of expenses on instruction. These 
results indicate that a one percentage point increase in the overall percentage of funds 
expended on instruction, holding all other variables constant, raises full-time retention rates by 
.248 points. Model 2, which adds a control for junior colleges, was also significant (Wald 
chi2(12)=31.33, p≤.01). The same significant predictor, percentage of expenses on instruction, 
was found. This output suggests that accounting for junior colleges increases the predicted 
average full-time retention rate by an additional .009 percentage point over Model 1. Both 
models were also applied to part-time retention rates but only Model 2 was found to be 
significant (Wald chi2(12)=21.01, p≤.05). The regression estimates indicate that, on average, 
junior colleges have part-time retention rates that are 11.061 points greater than community 
colleges, the reference group used in the model. This finding is supported by the mean part-time 
retention rates outlined for each type of institution in table 2.  
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Table 3: GLS Regression Estimates for Retention & Graduation Rates 
       
  Full-time Retention  Part-time Retention  Graduation Rate 
  Model 1 Model 2  Model 1 Model 2  Model 1 Model 2 
  Coef. 
(S.E.) 
Coef. 
(S.E.) 
 Coef. 
(S.E.) 
Coef. 
(S.E.) 
 Coef. 
(S.E.) 
Coef. 
(S.E.) 
          
Full-time 
enrollment (log) 
1.219 
(1.255) 
1.540 
(1.352) 
      
Part-time 
enrollment (log) 
   0.199 
(2.437) 
1.676 
(2.452) 
   
FTE enrollment 
(log) 
      3.082 
(2.542) 
2.885 
(2.552) 
% Full-time white 
enrollment 
-0.068 
(0.063) 
-0.061 
(0.068) 
      
% Part-time white 
enrollment 
   -0.090 
(0.119) 
-0.040 
(0.118) 
   
% White  
enrollment 
      0.147 
(0.128) 
0.146 
(0.128) 
% Revenue from 
state funds 
-0.039 
(0.085) 
-0.020 
(0.087) 
 -0.151 
(0.153) 
-0.120 
(0.150) 
 0.006 
(0.132) 
0.004 
(0.132) 
% Revenue from 
tuition & fees 
0.071 
(0.130) 
0.098 
(0.132) 
 0.096 
(0.224) 
0.129 
(0.219) 
 -0.351 
(0.185) 
-0.358** 
(0.186) 
% Expenses for 
instruction 
0.248* 
(0.107) 
0.257* 
(0.111) 
 0.322 
(0.212) 
0.290 
(0.208) 
 0.283 
(0.178) 
0.286 
(0.178) 
% Expenses for 
student support 
-0.075 
(0.108) 
-0.099 
(0.109) 
 0.383 
(0.213) 
0.299 
(0.211) 
 0.062 
(0.147) 
0.061 
(0.148) 
Regional median 
income (log) 
2.358 
(4.900) 
4.561 
(5.268) 
 -6.524 
(9.836) 
-1.411 
(9.823) 
 5.352 
(8.074) 
5.476 
(8.179) 
% Regional white 
population 
0.062 
(0.107) 
0.060 
(0.109) 
 -0.141 
(0.199) 
-0.099 
(0.195) 
 -0.113 
(0.168) 
-0.115 
(0.168) 
Regional (K-12) 
score 
0.980 
(1.394) 
0.874 
(1.398) 
 1.186 
(2.736) 
1.173 
(2.672) 
 0.860 
(2.245) 
0.898 
(2.264) 
Grad Act -2.378 
(1.616) 
-2.387 
(1.629) 
 0.313 
(3.207) 
0.612 
(3.135) 
 5.753** 
(2.256) 
5.827** 
(2.270) 
Technical College 4.586 
(2.633) 
4.958 
(2.869) 
 5.205 
(4.753) 
8.014 
(4.776) 
 28.227** 
(4.687) 
28.650** 
(4.770) 
Junior College  2.879 
(3.020) 
  11.061** 
(4.433) 
  1.412 
(5.764) 
Intercept 7.564 
(52.169) 
-20.329 
(56.924) 
 105.035 
(99.953) 
32.145 
(101.896) 
 -77.999 
(84.143) 
-77.953 
(86.532) 
Wald chi2 35.41** 31.33**  14.10 21.01*  104.23** 111.91** 
Note: Retention Rate models (N=120) include data from 2008-2015. Graduation Rate models (N=105) 
include data from 2009-2015. *p≤.05. **p≤.01 
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Graduation Rate 
 As mentioned previously, graduation rates derived from IPEDS data are based on first-
time, full-time degree/certificate-seeking students. In this study, I focus on those students that 
completed their program within 150% of normal time (the amount of time necessary for a 
student to complete all requirements for a degree or certificate). On average, rates increased 
from 23% to 26.8%, but these changes were not found to be statistically significant. Although all 
types of institutions were able to increase their graduation rates in the years since the GRAD 
Act was passed, only community colleges demonstrated a significant improvement. They raised 
their mean rate from 8.6% to 13.1% (t=-2.62, p≤.01). Across all years, technical colleges 
maintained the highest graduation rate by averaging 46.9% compared to 11.2% by community 
colleges and 11.1% by junior colleges. As with retention rates, I attribute these sizeable 
differences to the shorter length of programs that technical colleges tend to offer. Unfortunately, 
since most studies examining the impact of performance-based funding policies on graduation 
rates have concentrated on bachelor degree granting institutions, there is currently no research 
on which to compare these findings. 
 As with retention, I applied a random-effects GLS model to graduation rates. The models 
for graduation rates utilized the same estimates as with retention rates, but instead of 
differentiating between full-time and part-time enrollment, FTE enrollment was used as the 
control variable.  
 
Model 1: y=B0 +B1lnfte_enroll +B2white% +B3rstate% +B4rtuition% +B5einstruc% 
+B6esupport% +B7lnreg_income +B8reg_white% +B9zreg_score +B10tech 
+B11grad_act +ui 
 
Model 2: y=B0 +B1lnfte_enroll +B2white% +B3rstate% +B4rtuition% +B5einstruc% 
+B6esupport% +B7lnreg_income +B8reg_white% +B9zreg_score 
+B10junior +B11grad_act +ui 
 
Model 1 was found to be statistically significant (Wald chi2(11)=104.23, p≤.001). Two significant 
predictors were found at p≤.05: GRAD Act and Technical College. These results suggest that 
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graduation rates, on average, were 5.753 points greater after the implementation of the GRAD 
Act and technical colleges tend to have graduation rates 28.227 points higher than community 
colleges. Model 2 yielded almost identical results. The equation was found to be significant 
(Wald chi2(12)=111.91, p≤.001) and included the same predictors. 
Awards Productivity 
 As seen in recent studies, I expect an upsurge in short-term certificates and limited 
increases in long-term certificates and associate degrees (Hillman, Tandberg, and Fryar 2015; 
Hillman, Tandberg, and Gross 2014; Rutherford and Rabovsky 2014; Tandberg, Hillman, and 
Barakat 2015; Umbricht, Fernandez, and Ortagus 2015). I did not find the anticipated increase 
in short-term certificates, but data revealed a slight uptick in the number of long-term certificates 
and associate degrees conferred. Although the average quantity of short-term certificates 
increased from 631.5 to 840.6, it was not a significant difference. Community colleges were the 
only type of institution to increase their short-term certificates. They experienced an average 
increase of 238.9 certificates (t=-2.12; p≤.05). These results did not hold when I examined short-
term certificates per 100 FTE. No significant differences were found across two-year colleges or 
in any institution type. Actually, short-term certificates decreased by almost 10 certificates per 
100 FTE after implementation of the GRAD Act. Seemingly, junior colleges have stayed out of 
the business of issuing short-term certificates altogether.  
 Interestingly, as shown in the first graph of figure 2, the number of short-term certificates 
fell greatly between 2009 and 2010. I surmise that the drop resulted from a change in reporting 
technique that eliminated the inclusion of non-credit certificates. When I explored this 
phenomenon further, I found the data on short-term certificates troubling. There are huge 
disparities not only between institutions, even those in the same category, but also within 
institutions (see Appendix B). Junior colleges remained consistent in issuing the rare certificate, 
but some community colleges reported none over the eight years of this study. These numbers 
do not coincide with those reported to the Louisiana Board of Regents (2016 Louisiana Higher 
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Education Fact Book). Again, perhaps misunderstandings on degree definitions are occurring. 
However, this does not explain the wide fluctuations within a college’s own reporting. I can only 
presume that some colleges received funds for a specialized short-term program that was not 
continued in the following academic year.  
 
Figure 2: Awards Productivity per 100 Full-time Equivalent 
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 There were greater consistencies in data on long-term certificates, those taking at least 
one to two-years to complete. On average, the number of certificates increased significantly 
from 240.8 to 498.1(t=-4.45, p≤.001). Community colleges and technical colleges saw increases 
of 202.4% (t=-3.98, p≤.001) and 69.1% (t=-3.58, p≤.001), respectively. The gains for long-term 
certificates per FTE were likewise significant, although the percentage increases were not of the 
same magnitude. As with short-term certificates, junior colleges saw little to no movement in 
their numbers. An examination of associate degrees conferred revealed an overall increase 
from 201.7 to 292.1 (t=-1.7228, p≤.01). However, in opposition to findings on certificates, the 
only type of institution to realize gains was junior colleges. They experienced a 15.9% (t=-3.53, 
p≤.01) increase. Although similar results were found overall and for junior colleges when I 
standardized associate degrees per 100 FTE, significant increases for community colleges also 
presented themselves. They grew the number of associate degrees per 100 FTE from 8 to 10.5 
(t=-3.76, p≤.001). Technical colleges experienced a slight increase in associate degrees, but the 
change was not significant. These results tend to fall in line with the given missions of the 
individual type of institution. Remarkably, while a significant increase of 50% (t=-2.70, p≤.001) in 
total awards occurred across all two-year colleges, these gains completely disappeared when 
standardized against 100 FTE. The total number of awards per 100 FTE actually remained flat. 
It seems that the implementation of the GRAD Act had no real impact on the number of awards 
conferred. 
 GLS logistic regression models were applied to the four dependent measures related to 
awards productivity. All models utilized the same predictors as in the graduation rate equations. 
Model 1: Pr(y=1)=F(B0 +B1lnfte_enroll +B2white% +B3rstate% +B4rtuition% 
+B5einstruc% +B6esupport% +B7lnreg_income +B8reg_white% 
+B9zreg_score +B10tech +B11grad_act) +ui 
 
Model 2: Pr(y=1)=F(B0 +B1lnfte_enroll +B2white% +B3rstate% +B4rtuition% 
+B5einstruc% +B6esupport% +B7lnreg_income +B8reg_white% 
+B9zreg_score +B10junior +B11grad_act) +ui 
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Significant increases in performance occurred in 2010 and 2014 for short-term certifications; 
2010, 2011, 2012, and 2014 for associate degrees; and 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2014 for long-
term certificates and total awards. Both Model 1 (Wald chi2(11)=23.32, p≤.05) and Model 2 
(Wald chi2(12)=23.76, p≤.05) applied to associate degree productivity were found to be 
statistically significant. In each equation, two significant predictors were found at p≤.05: 
percentage of core revenue from state funds and percentage of expenses on student support. 
The results for Model 1 indicate that for each percentage point increase in revenue derived from 
state funds, the odds of a significant increase in performance from the prior year decreases by a 
factor of 0.883, holding all other variables constant. A similar outcome was found for percentage 
of expenses on student support. Each percentage point increase in expenses on student 
support decreases the odds of a significant increase in performance by a factor of 0.900. As the 
odds predicted by Model 2 were identical to Model 1, I can conclude that the added control for 
junior colleges did not impact associate degree productivity. 
 Obviously, these results are nonsensical. As noted in the descriptive statistics, state 
funds fell consistently as a percentage of revenue while the percentage of expenses on student 
support remained relatively flat except for in 2015 when there was a dramatic 11 percentage 
point increase. The large increase in 2015 disrupts the equation and allows for improved 
performance to be aligned with smaller percentages of expenses on student support. If 2015 is 
omitted from the equation, this variable is no longer a significant predictor. These findings are 
not an indication that less state funding or decreases in expenses on student support increases 
performance, but are simply a reflection that these events happened to occur during the time 
span of this study. Clearly, a longer time frame in which to study the lagged effects of the GRAD 
Act is needed in order to judge whether increases in performance in associate degree 
productivity remains related to these predictors.  
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 As the years in which performance increased were the same for long-term certificates 
and total awards, the logistic regression outputs were identical. Both Model 1 (Wald 
chi2(11)=29.34, p≤.05) and Model 2 (Wald chi2(12)=29.32, p≤.05) were found to be statistically 
Table 4: GLS Logistic Regression Estimates for Award Productivity 
              Associate Degrees  Long-term Certificates &  
Total Awards 
  Model 1 Model 2  Model 1 Model 2 
  OR 
(S.E.) 
OR 
(S.E.) 
 OR 
(S.E.) 
OR 
(S.E.) 
       FTE enrollment (log)  1.564 
(0.697) 
1.730 
(0.796) 
 0.992 
(0.454) 
1.014 
(0.478) 
% White enrollment  1.014 
(0.022) 
1.018 
(0.023) 
 0.982 
(0.022) 
0.983 
(0.022) 
% Revenue from state 
funds 
 0.883** 
(0.028) 
0.883** 
(0.028) 
 0.946 
(0.028) 
0.946 
(0.028) 
% Revenue from tuition & 
fees 
 0.968 
(0.042) 
0.968 
(0.042) 
 1.044 
(0.048) 
1.044 
(0.048) 
% Expenses for 
instruction 
 1.011 
(0.037) 
1.010 
(0.037) 
 0.997 
(0.037) 
0.997 
(0.037) 
% Expenses for student 
support 
 0.900** 
(0.038) 
0.896** 
(0.038) 
 0.945 
(0.040) 
0.944 
(0.040) 
Regional median income 
(log) 
 2.560 
4.241 
3.857 
(6.632) 
 0.621 
(1.036) 
0.688 
(1.202) 
% Regional white 
population 
 0.948 
(0.035) 
0.948 
(0.036) 
 0.998 
(0.037) 
0.999 
(0.037) 
Regional (K-12) score  1.483 
(0.712) 
1.521 
(0.736) 
 1.136 
(0.573) 
1.135 
(0.570) 
Grad Act  0.456 
(0.256) 
0.460 
(0.260) 
 0.044** 
(0.029) 
0.044** 
(0.029) 
Technical College  2.711 
(2.289) 
3.293 
(2.884) 
 2.142 
(1.891) 
2.232 
(2.028) 
Junior College   2.068 
(1.623) 
  1.178 
(0.983) 
Intercept  0.011 
(0.184) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
 17587.52 
(312159.6) 
4491.622 
(85528.23) 
Wald chi2  23.32* 23.76*  29.34* 29.32** 
                       Note: Models (N=120) include data from 2008-2015. *p≤.05. **p≤.01 
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significant. In each equation, only one significant predictor was found at p≤.05: Grad Act. The 
results indicate that, holding all other variables constant, the odds of an increase in performance 
in long-term certificates and total awards productivity decreased by a factor of 0.044 after the 
GRAD Act was introduced. A closer look at the data reveals that of the four years in which an 
increase in performance was found, three of those were before the GRAD Act. These results do 
not suggest that the GRAD Act actually caused performance to drop, but that performance did 
not increase as a result of its implementation. Again, controlling for junior colleges did not 
impact the overall findings. Their performance was not significantly different from community 
colleges. Neither model for short-term certificates was found to be statistically significant. The 
lack of years in which increases in performance occurred reduced the likelihood that the 
equations would produce meaningful estimates. 
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Conclusion 
 The Louisiana Granting Resources and Autonomies for Diplomas Act (GRAD Act), 
signed into law in June 2010, instituted performance benchmarks for state colleges that, if met, 
allowed them to increase their own tuition by up to 10% per year. Additionally, the performance-
based funding policy tied 15% of a college’s overall state funding to meeting the GRAD Act 
goals. In this study, I attempt to discover if this law and its financial incentives were able to 
inspire two-year schools to improve performance. My findings were inconclusive. Across all two-
year schools, graduation rates remained around 24%. The only type of institution to significantly 
increase its graduation numbers was community colleges. However, their rates only increased 
from a paltry 8.6% to 13.1%. However, regression estimates indicated that the GRAD Act was a 
significant predictor and that graduation rates tended to be 5.753 points higher after its 
implementation. This provides some confirmation that the GRAD Act had a positive impact on 
graduation rates of two-year institutions in Louisiana. Similar studies on the impact of 
performance-based funding policies found no evidence of increased graduation rates at 
bachelor degree granting institutions (Fryar 2011; Rutherford and Rabovsky 2014; Sanford and 
Hunter 2011; Shin 2010; Shin and Milton 2004). Unfortunately, no other studies on rates at two-
year schools are available for comparison.  
 Although understandable as a standardizing measure, I find graduation rates a poor 
comparison tool. Even when narrowing down the pool to only two-year institutions, there were 
great disparities between types of institution. This highlights the confusing nature of reporting 
the same measure across schools with different missions. Also, since the measure only 
includes first-time/full-time students, I believe that it provides little value in an environment in 
which students may be more likely to attend school part-time, transfer between institutions, 
and/or have varying educational goals. It seems best to marry graduation rates with other 
measures such as time-to-degree completion, retention, articulation agreements, and/or degree 
productivity when evaluating school performance.  
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 The GRAD Act did not directly increase full-time retention rates, which remained flat 
across all years included in the study. However, regression estimates did reveal a link between 
percentage of expenses on instruction and full-time retention. These results indicate that a one 
percentage point increase in the overall percentage of funds expended on instruction improved 
full-time retention by about a quarter of a percentage point. Some improvements were also 
found in part-time retention. The average rate across two-year institutions grew five percentage 
points after the GRAD Act was introduced. This increase is due largely to the double-digit 
change in part-time retention rate at technical colleges. As technical colleges tend to offer more 
one-year or less certificate programs, which usually do not require full-time attendance, their 
part-time retention rates are most likely inflated by their greater quantity of enrollees and 
completers. Still, the corresponding regression output did not indicate that any improvements in 
part-time retention rates were related to the GRAD Act. These results tend to mirror those found 
in other national and state-level (Tennessee and Washington) studies (Hillman, Tandberg, and 
Fryar 2015; Rutherford and Rabovsky 2014; Sanford and Hunter 2011).  
 The data did not indicate the anticipated increase in short-term certificates (Hillman, 
Tandberg, and Fryar 2015; Hillman, Tandberg, and Gross 2014; Rutherford and Rabovsky 
2014; Tandberg, Hillman, and Barakat 2015; Umbricht, Fernandez, and Ortagus 2015), but did 
reveal an uptick in the number of long-term certificates and associate degrees conferred. On 
average, the number of associate degrees issued grew by 44.8%, while the number of long-
term certificates increased 106.9%. These increases are still visible when the numbers of 
awards were standardized against 100 FTE. However, the corresponding regression estimates 
for both associate degrees and long-term certificates/total awards give little indication that the 
introduction of the GRAD Act was the catalyst for these changes. The models for associate 
degrees absurdly predicted that a decrease in state funds and expenses on student support 
increased productivity, while, the models for long-term certificates/total awards indicated that the 
implementation of the GRAD Act actually caused declines in productivity. I can discern that the 
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implementation of the GRAD Act had little direct positive impact on awards productivity, 
regardless of type. Obviously, more time, data, and stability in the community college and 
technical systems are required before any real conclusions can be drawn about the long-term 
impacts of the GRAD Act on institutional effectiveness.  
 Even though findings imply that the financial incentives provided through performance-
based funding policies do not greatly contribute to improvements in certain institutional 
performance measures, there are examples of positive impacts generated by these types of 
funding models. Some suggest that the performance reporting required by these policies 
actually produce the greatest benefit. As one article noted in 2002, the “threat of bad publicity 
and embarrassment associated with poor reviews” may be more impactful than funding 
schemes in altering institutional behavior (Schmidt 2002). In 2015, Stan Jones from the 
Complete College America Organization echoed this sentiment. He recommends that states 
maintain PBF policies because they encourage transparency by forcing colleges to continue 
performance reporting (Mangan 2015). If done correctly, performance reporting offers the public 
and lawmakers a barometer against which to compare schools of interest. However, it also 
provides an avenue for many to misunderstand and incorrectly equate schools of dissimilar 
mission. Unfortunately, Louisiana’s current format of performance reporting does not provide 
enough differentiation between institution types for the layperson to make intelligent decisions. 
This muddling could allow a community college to be disparaged because its graduation rate 
was unfairly compared to the state’s flagship four-year university. Regrettably, empirical 
research that directly links performance reporting and the possibility of resulting embarrassment 
as a method of improving institutional performance is insufficient from which to draw 
conclusions. 
 I contend that the greatest achievement of the GRAD Act has been the improvement in 
the quality of higher education data. As revealed through performance audits conducted by the 
Louisiana Legislative Auditor’s Office, there has been a significant increase in the reliability of 
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the data provided to the state by post-secondary institutions. In fact, only one school was found 
to have had any audit findings during the 2016 audit (see table 5). I also found a greater 
consistency across data reported to IPEDS once the state instituted the auditing process in 
response to the GRAD Act. Perhaps the funding model could still have long-term beneficial 
effects if the colleges utilize the wealth of information provided through performance reporting 
as an internal management tool to guide decision-making (Miller, Robbins, and Keum 2007).  
 
Table 5: Performance Audit Findings of Not Sufficiently Reliable Data 
Institution 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
      
Baton Rouge Community College X X X   
Bossier Parish Community College  X   X 
Capital Area Technical College* X  X   
Central Louisiana Technical Community College X X  X  
Delgado Community College      
Fletcher Technical Community College X X  X  
Louisiana State University-Eunice      
Northshore Technical Community College X X    
Northwest Louisiana Technical College X X    
Nunez Community College  X    
River Parishes Community College      
South Central Louisiana Technical College X X    
South Louisiana Community College X X X X  
Southern University at Shreveport X X X X  
SOWELA Technical Community College  X    
            
Source: Louisiana Legislative Auditor      
*In 2014 Capital Area Technical College merged with Baton Rouge Community College so was not 
audited separately in 2014 and 2015 
 
 Regardless of the benefits ushered in by performance-based funding legislation, there 
remain a plethora of concerns about the unintended consequences that may result from 
mandated benchmarks. Various researchers and some college officials predict that pressure to 
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meet these performance standards may force some schools to increase selectivity and/or lower 
academic standards. Evidence that performance-based funding requirements have forced four-
year institutions to increase selectivity through higher admissions requirements has been 
documented in Indiana, Ohio, and Tennessee (Dougherty et al. 2016; Umbricht, Fernandez, and 
Ortagus 2015). In Louisiana, increasing minimum standards at four-year schools was actually a 
tenet of the GRAD Act. The legislation called for four-year institutions to raise their minimum 
American College Test (ACT) score required for admission, eliminate remedial/developmental 
course offerings, and discontinue associate degree programs (Louisiana Granting Resources 
and Autonomy for Diplomas Act 2010). Seemingly, two-year schools have benefited as a result. 
As previously mentioned, enrollment numbers suggest that tuition hikes and these more 
restrictive admissions standards are forcing more Louisiana students to choose two-year 
colleges (Russell 2016). However, while four-year schools may be more likely to meet their 
benchmarks because of this refined student body, two-year schools have the added burden of 
fulfilling performance requirements with an even larger population of students who tend to have 
long-standing academic, social, and financial challenges (Dougherty et al. 2016). Again, this is 
why it is so important to differentiate between missions in establishing performance measures. 
 Some fear that increased selectivity might reduce racial and ethnic diversity on college 
campuses. After decades of concentrating on expanding access for underrepresented and/or 
disadvantaged students, higher education reformers seem to have shifted focus to maximizing 
performance (Burke1998). Unfortunately, maximizing performance through raised admission 
standards may prevent some marginalized students from attending college or even being 
recruited. Evidence suggests that schools have changed their recruiting habits to focus on those 
students more likely to meet the new standards and complete their programs instead of 
broadening their student base (Dougherty, et al. 2016). Diversity can further be stilted when 
schools switch from issuing need-based financial aid to merit-based. The additional financial 
resources many minority students require may not be available because schools could transfer 
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those funds to students they deem more likely to be retained or graduated (Dougherty, et al. 
2016; Umbricht, Fernandez, and Ortagus 2015). This can happen at both four-year schools and 
open-admission colleges. Actually, this study provides some indication that diversity may be 
declining at Louisiana four-year schools. There has been a 7.3% increase in non-white FTE 
enrollment at two-year schools since the GRAD Act was signed into law. Although it is 
impossible to say definitively this change is a result of decreased access for minority students at 
the state’s four-year schools, it is an interesting statistic that should be explored further. 
 Others worry that increased mandated performance goals may cause schools to lower 
academic standards (Alexander 2000; Dougherty, et al. 2016; Umbricht, Fernandez, and 
Ortagus 2015). This can occur when faculty is instructed to reduce failure rates by inflating 
grades or lessening course rigor. Schools can also scale back the number of required courses 
needed for graduation. This is a more subtle way in which to fast track completion numbers 
compared to inflated grades, but still effective for helping to meet performance benchmarks. Yet 
another concern is the growth in the issuance of worthless degrees. Across the country, there 
has been marked increases in short-term certificate programs, both credit and non-credit. 
Although these awards help schools more quickly meet productivity measures and increase 
revenue, research has shown that they have very limited economic value when compared to 
associate degrees or even long-term certificates (Dadgar and Trimble 2015; Hillman, Tandberg, 
and Fryar 2015; Xu and Trimble 2016). Some, mostly those in higher education, assert that 
short-term successes, like receiving one of these certificates, are important for struggling 
students (Mangan 2014). They declare that these short-term gains encourage students to later 
pursue more long-term credentials and/or degrees. Obviously, additional empirical research 
needs to be conducted on this assertion before any definitive conclusions can be drawn on the 
true worth of these types of awards. 
As much of the literature finds that performance-based funding is not a panacea for all 
state budgetary and performance ills, why do states still look to PBF as a solution? It seems that 
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politics is one of the main, if not the most important, influence in turning to a performance-based 
funding model for higher education (Burke and Minassians 2003; McLendon, Hearn and Mokher 
2009; Tandberg 2010). Lawmakers believe that these types of funding programs show their 
constituents that they are being good stewards of public funding by helping “to reduce or 
eliminate wasteful activities…and to get more ‘bang for the buck’ by spending less money on 
programs that do not work and more on those that do” (Rabovsky 2012, 676). Given its 
popularity, it seems that performance-based funding will remain part of the higher education 
landscape (Schmidt 2002). 
A number of recommendations exist on how states can design and implement 
performance-based policies that would help to increase their impact on higher education and 
reduce any unintended negative consequences (Friedal et al. 2013; Hermes 2012; Miao. 2012). 
Policy makers must obtain buy-in from key stakeholders such as legislators, college 
administrators, faculty, and local business and industry leader. Without input from involved 
parties, implementation of the program will be difficult. States should include both outcome and 
progress measures that reflect the diverse nature of missions, recognize interim successes, and 
reflect regional needs. Using these varied types of measures will provide a more complete 
picture of effectiveness and performance. However, states should be wary of overly complex 
metrics that can cause confusion and reduce the effectiveness and implementation of 
performance-based policies. Burke, Modarresi and Serban (1999) tell us that the “most 
successful programs include from eight to 15 indicators” because “having too few indicators 
ignores many of the multiple objectives of colleges and universities. Having too many indicators 
trivializes major priorities by according them very little funding” (22).  
 New funding models should be phased in so institutions have time to set reasonable 
benchmarks, adjust procedures, and build organizational capacity. Unfortunately, hurried 
implementation of performance funding can leave colleges with “little detail on what specific 
institutional changes are expected and how those changes are to be achieved” (ASHE 2013, 
 
40 
12). This is why it is so crucial that states commit significant stable funding that both incentivizes 
institutions to increase performance and allows for long-term planning. Institutions need to see 
that they will be gaining additional resources in order to find performance-based funding worthy 
of their time and effort. Finally, programs must be given a long enough period in which to be 
effective. In instances where gains have been found, they did not generally present themselves 
until six to eight years after implementation (Layzell 1998). Longevity allows for more productive 
and thorough evaluations of policy tenets and related metrics (Sanford; Hillman, Shin and Milton 
2004; Tandberg, and Fryar 2015). 
The area of performance-based funding is rife with research possibilities. Additional 
multivariate research that attempts to disentangle the effects of PBF from other events like 
political happenings, school mergers, and increased admission requirements needs to be 
conducted. Although generalizability is gained through national and/or regional studies of this 
kind, I believe that state-level studies allow researchers to better detail the specifics surrounding 
a policy’s implementation and how those particulars affect its impact. I would also like to see 
more long-term studies that follow students who have obtained the short and/or long-term 
certificates seemingly encouraged by performance-based funding policies to see if they return to 
further their education and to what extent these additional credentials impact earnings. Lastly, 
there needs to be more scholarship on how substantial shifts in school expenditures away from 
administrative support and toward instruction and student services affect school performance. 
 Although the GRAD Act has produced limited gains in institutional effectiveness, I 
believe that a revamped version could yield the improvements that we all seek in higher 
education. Most state colleges were excited for the opportunity to utilize the performance-based 
funding model created in the GRAD Act to increase their coffers with the side benefit of 
improving graduation rates. Unfortunately, like most performance-based funding legislation, it 
become a way for colleges to simply maintain budget levels during a time of declining state 
support rather than an impetus for increasing institutional accomplishments (Alexander 2000; 
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Serban and Burke 1998). This has to change in order for the policy to be effective. Obviously, 
the state must provide adequate financial support to the colleges. However, colleges must also 
make the necessary changes in expenditures and organization needed to facilitate 
improvement. This will require hard and uncomfortable decisions to be made by administrators, 
but those decisions should not be made without faculty and staff input. Also, the Louisiana 
Board of Regents must provide leadership to the colleges on how to build the organizational 
capacity required to provide the best education for their students. The updated policy should 
include separate measures for two-year and four-year schools that are specific to their mission. 
These measures should incentivize schools and not penalize them for providing access to 
underrepresented groups. Also, benchmarks need to be more robust. Over the course of the six 
years that the GRAD Act has been in effect, there have only been five instances in which one of 
the 15 two-year schools did not meet the required minimum level of 80% in student success to 
gain authority to raise tuition (see Appendix C: Supplemental Table 2). Since findings from this 
study suggest that the increases in retention, graduation rates, and awards productivity were 
either limited or nonexistent, I can assume that the required standards were rather minor. 
Ultimately, in any discussion about money and performance, we need to remember the students 
and the faculty/staff of the institutions. Institutions do not make improvements; the people who 
work there do. Liefner (2003) reminds us that colleges “with a large number of highly motivated 
and qualified faculty will be successful regardless of the form of resource allocation;” a 
sentiment which should remain at the forefront of any decision regarding higher education (486). 
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Appendix A: Codebook 
Variable: Institution Abbreviation 
Variable Name: inst 
Value Labels: brcc: Baton Rouge Community College; bpcc: Bossier Parish Community 
College; catc: Capital Area Technical College; cltcc: Central Louisiana 
Technical Community College; dcc: Delgado Community College; lsue: 
Louisiana State University-Eunice; ntcc: Northshore Technical 
Community College; nwltc: Northwest Louisiana Technical College; ncc: 
Nunez Community College; rpcc: River Parishes Community College; 
scltc: South Central Louisiana Technical College; slcc: South Louisiana 
Community College; suas: Southern University at Shreveport; sowela: 
SOWELA Technical Community College 
Data Source & 
Tables: 
Louisiana Community & Technical College System website, Louisiana 
State University System website, Southern University System website 
Definition: Commonly used abbreviation of an institution's name. Represents the 
panel dataset-defining variable. 
Variable: Academic Year 
Variable Name: aydate 
Data Source & 
Tables: 
IPEDS: HD2014, HD2013, HD2012, HD2011, HD2010, HD2009, 
HD2008, HD2007 
Definition: An academic year begins with the Fall semester (August-December) and 
carries over into the Spring semester (January-May) and Summer 
semester (June-July) of the following calendar year. Represents the time 
defining variable. Dataset includes date from 2008 to 2015. 
Variable: Total Awards Productivity 
Variable Name: awards 
Value Labels: 1=Yes; a statistically significant positive difference was found 
0=No; a statistically significant positive difference was not found 
Data Source & 
Tables: 
IPEDS: DRVC2015, DRVC2014, DRVC2013_RV, DRVC2012_RV, 
DRVC2011_RV, DRVC2010_RV, DRVC2009_RV, DRVC2008_RV 
Definition: Dummy variable indicating whether a paired sample t test found a 
statistically significant difference in means between two consecutive 
academic years' total number of awards conferred -- including 
certificates, 1-year certificates, 2-year certificates, and associate 
degrees. 
Variable: Associate Degree Productivity 
Variable Name: awards_ad 
Value Labels: 1=Yes; a statistically significant positive difference was found 
0=No; a statistically significant positive difference was not found 
Data Source & 
Tables: 
IPEDS: DRVC2015, DRVC2014, DRVC2013_RV, DRVC2012_RV, 
DRVC2011_RV, DRVC2010_RV, DRVC2009_RV, DRVC2008_RV 
Definition: Dummy variable indicating whether a paired sample t test found a 
statistically significant difference in means between two consecutive 
academic years' number of associate degrees conferred. An associate 
degree requires completion of an organized program of study of at least 
2 but less than 4 years of full-time equivalent college work. 
Variable: Long-term Certificate Productivity 
Variable Name: awards_certlong 
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Value Labels: 1=Yes; a statistically significant positive difference was found 
0=No; a statistically significant positive difference was not found 
Data Source & 
Tables: 
IPEDS: DRVC2015, DRVC2014, DRVC2013_RV, DRVC2012_RV, 
DRVC2011_RV, DRVC2010_RV, DRVC2009_RV, DRVC2008_RV 
Definition: Dummy variable indicating whether a paired sample t test found a 
statistically significant difference in means between two consecutive 
academic years' number of long-term certificates conferred. A long-term 
certificate requires completion of an organized program of study in at 
least 2 but less than 4 full-time equivalent academic years or designed 
for completion in at least 60 but less than 120 semester credit hours. 
Variable: Short-term Certificate Productivity 
Variable Name: awards_cert 
Value Labels: 1=Yes; a statistically significant positive difference was found 
0=No; a statistically significant positive difference was not found 
Data Source & 
Tables: 
IPEDS: DRVC2015, DRVC2014, DRVC2013_RV, DRVC2012_RV, 
DRVC2011_RV, DRVC2010_RV, DRVC2009_RV, DRVC2008_RV 
Definition: Dummy variable indicating whether a paired sample t test found a 
statistically significant difference in means between two consecutive 
academic years' number of short-term certificates conferred. A short-
term certificate requires the completion of an organized program of study 
in less than 1 academic year (2 semesters), or designed for completion 
in less than 30 semester credit hours. 
Variable: Part-time Retention Rate 
Variable Name: pret% 
Data Source & 
Tables: 
IPEDS: EF2014D, EF2013D_RV, EF2012D_RV, EF2011D_RV, 
EF2010D_RV, EF2009D_RV, EF2008D_RV, EF2007D 
Definition: Part-time retention rate is the percentage of the fall part-time cohort of 
first-time degree/certificate-seeking students from the prior year (minus 
exclusions) that re-enrolled at the institution as either full- or part-time or 
successfully completed their program by the current fall. Exclusions 
include students who could not reenroll because of death, permanent 
disability, armed service duty, foreign aid service duty, or church mission 
service. 
Variable: Full-time Retention Rate 
Variable Name: fret% 
Data Source & 
Tables: 
IPEDS: EF2014D, EF2013D_RV, EF2012D_RV, EF2011D_RV, 
EF2010D_RV, EF2009D_RV, EF2008D_RV, EF2007D 
Definition: Full-time retention rate is the percentage of the fall full-time cohort of 
first-time degree/certificate-seeking students from the prior year (minus 
exclusions) that re-enrolled at the institution as either full- or part-time or 
successfully completed their program by the current fall. Exclusions 
include students who could not reenroll because of death, permanent 
disability, armed service duty, foreign aid service duty, or church mission 
service. 
Variable: Graduation Rate 
Variable Name: grad% 
Data Source & 
Tables: 
IPEDS: DRVG2015, DRVG2014, DRVG2013_RV, DRVG2012_RV, 
DRVG2011_RV, DRVG2010_RV, DRVG2009_RV 
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Definition: Graduation rate is the percentage of the first-time, full-time 
degree/certificate-seeking graduation cohort that completed a program 
within 150% of normal time (the amount of time necessary for a student 
to complete all requirements for a degree or certificate according to the 
institution's catalog). This rate is calculated as the total number of 
completers within 150% of normal time divided by the revised cohort 
minus any allowable exclusions. Exclusions include students who could 
not reenroll because of death, permanent disability, armed service duty, 
foreign aid service duty, or church mission service. 
Variable: Part-time Enrollment Rate 
Variable Name: penroll% 
Data Source & 
Tables: 
IPEDS: DRVEF2014, DRVEF2013_RV, DRVEF2012_RV, 
DRVEF2011_RV, DRVEF2010_RV, DRVEF2009_RV, DRVEF2008_RV, 
DRVEF2007 
Definition: Total number of part-time students enrolled in the fall semester divided 
by the total number of students enrolled in the same semester. 
Variable: Full-time Enrollment Rate 
Variable Name: fenroll% 
Data Source & 
Tables: 
IPEDS: DRVEF2014, DRVEF2013_RV, DRVEF2012_RV, 
DRVEF2011_RV, DRVEF2010_RV, DRVEF2009_RV, DRVEF2008_RV, 
DRVEF2007 
Definition: Total number of full-time students enrolled in the fall semester divided by 
the total number of students enrolled in the same semester. 
Variable: Full-time Equivalent (FTE) Enrollment 
Variable Name: lnfte_enroll 
Data Source & 
Tables: 
IPEDS: DRVEF2014, DRVEF2013_RV, DRVEF2012_RV, 
DRVEF2011_RV, DRVEF2010_RV, DRVEF2009_RV, DRVEF2008_RV, 
DRVEF2007 
Definition: Log of FTE fall enrollment. The number of FTE students is calculated by 
adding the full-time fall student headcounts to the part-time fall 
headcount multiplied by 0.335737 (factor for public 2-year colleges). 
Variable: Part-time White Enrollment Rate 
Variable Name: pwhite% 
Data Source & 
Tables: 
IPEDS: EF2014A, EF2013A_RV, EF2012A_RV, EF2011A_RV, 
EF2010A_RV, EF2009A_RV, EF2008A_RV, EF2007A 
Definition: Total number of part-time white students enrolled during the fall 
semester divided by the total number of part-time students enrolled 
during that same semester. 
Variable: Full-time White Enrollment Rate 
Variable Name: fwhite% 
Data Source & 
Tables: 
IPEDS: EF2014A, EF2013A_RV, EF2012A_RV, EF2011A_RV, 
EF2010A_RV, EF2009A_RV, EF2008A_RV, EF2007A 
Definition: Total number of full-time white students enrolled during the fall semester 
divided by the total number of full-time students enrolled during that 
same semester. 
Variable: Total White Enrollment Rate 
Variable Name: white% 
Data Source & 
Tables: 
IPEDS: EF2014A, EF2013A_RV, EF2012A_RV, EF2011A_RV, 
EF2010A_RV, EF2009A_RV, EF2008A_RV, EF2007A 
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Definition: Total number of white students enrolled during the fall semester divided 
by the total number of students enrolled during that same semester. 
Variable: Full-time Equivalent (FTE) White Enrollment 
Variable Name: fte_white 
Data Source & 
Tables: 
IPEDS: EF2014A, EF2013A_RV, EF2012A_RV, EF2011A_RV, 
EF2010A_RV, EF2009A_RV, EF2008A_RV, EF2007A 
Definition: The number of white FTE students is calculated by adding the white full-
time fall student headcounts to the white part-time fall headcount 
multiplied by 0.335737 (factor for public 2-year colleges). 
Variable: Full-time Equivalent (FTE) Non-White Enrollment 
Variable Name: fte_nonwhite 
Data Source & 
Tables: 
IPEDS: EF2014A, EF2013A_RV, EF2012A_RV, EF2011A_RV, 
EF2010A_RV, EF2009A_RV, EF2008A_RV, EF2007A 
Definition: The number of non-white FTE students is calculated by adding the non-
white full-time fall student headcounts to the non-white part-time fall 
headcount multiplied by 0.335737 (factor for public 2-year colleges). 
Variable: Tuition & Fee Revenue Rate 
Variable Name: rtuition% 
Data Source & 
Tables: 
IPEDS: DRVF2015, DRVF2014, DRVF2013_RV, DRVF2012_RV, 
DRVF2011_RV, DRVF2010_RV, DRVF2009_RV, DRVF2008_RV 
Definition: Total percentage of core revenue derived from tuition and fees. 
Variable: State Appropriations Revenue Rate 
Variable Name: rstate% 
Data Source & 
Tables: 
IPEDS: DRVF2015, DRVF2014, DRVF2013_RV, DRVF2012_RV, 
DRVF2011_RV, DRVF2010_RV, DRVF2009_RV, DRVF2008_RV 
Definition: Total percentage of core revenue derived from state appropriations. 
Variable: Instruction Expense Rate 
Variable Name: einstruc% 
Data Source & 
Tables: 
IPEDS: DRVF2015, DRVF2014, DRVF2013_RV, DRVF2012_RV, 
DRVF2011_RV, DRVF2010_RV, DRVF2009_RV, DRVF2008_RV 
Definition: Total percentage of core expenses derived from instruction costs. 
Variable: Support Expense Rate 
Variable Name: esupport% 
Data Source & 
Tables: 
IPEDS: DRVF2015, DRVF2014, DRVF2013_RV, DRVF2012_RV, 
DRVF2011_RV, DRVF2010_RV, DRVF2009_RV, DRVF2008_RV 
Definition: Total percentage of core expenses derived from student services and 
academic support costs. 
Variable: Grad Act 
Variable Name: grad_act 
Variable Labels: 1=Yes; a GRAD Act agreement existed 
0=No; a GRAD Act agreement did not exist 
Data Source & 
Tables: 
Louisiana Board of Regents 
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Definition: Dummy variable indicating whether an institution had an agreement with 
the Board of Regents in which they received the authority to raise tuition 
up to 10% if certain targeted performance measures were achieved. 
Although the GRAD Act was signed into law in June 2010, institutions 
were not required to meet established performance measures until the 
2011-2012 academic year. As such, the 2012 academic year will act as 
year one of the GRAD Act. 
Variable: Accreditation 
Variable Name: tech 
Variable Labels: 1=Yes, the institution was a member of COE during that specific 
academic year 
0=No, the institution was not a member of COE during that specific 
academic year 
Data Source & 
Tables: 
Southern Association of Colleges and Schools Commission on Colleges 
(SACSCOC) Member and Candidate List (July 2016); Council on 
Occupational Education (COE) Membership Directory (June 2016) 
Definition: Dummy variable indicating whether an institution is a member of COE, 
thus considered a Technical College, during that specific academic year. 
Variable: Accreditation 
Variable Name: junior 
Variable Labels: 2=No, the institution was not a member of COE during that specific 
academic year & was managed by a four-year system 
1=Yes, the institution was a member of COE during that specific 
academic year 
0=No, the institution was not a member of COE during that specific 
academic year & was managed by the two-year system 
Data Source & 
Tables: 
Southern Association of Colleges and Schools Commission on Colleges 
(SACSCOC) Member and Candidate List (July 2016); Council on 
Occupational Education (COE) Membership Directory (June 2016) 
Definition: Factor variable indicating whether an institution is a Technical College, 
Community College, or Junior College during that specific academic 
year. 
Variable: Regional Median Income 
Variable Name: lnreg_income 
Data Source & 
Tables: 
2008 American Community Survey 3-Year Estimates, United States 
Bureau: ACS_08_3YR_B19013 & 2014 American Community Survey 5-
Year Estimates, United States Census Bureau: ACS_09_5YR_B19013; 
ACS_10_5YR_B19013; ACS_11_5YR_B19013; ACS_12_5YR_B19013; 
ACS_13_5YR_B19013; ACS14_5YR_B19013 & 2015 American 
Community Survey 1-Year Estimates, United States Bureau: 
ACS_15_1YR_B19013 
Definition: Log of the estimated regional median household income represented in 
2015 constant dollars. Regional represents the parish with the greatest 
level of enrollment at the institution during the academic year.  
Variable: Regional White Population Rate 
Variable Name: reg_white% 
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Data Source & 
Tables: 
2008 American Community Survey 3-Year Estimates Public Use 
Microdata Samples, United States Census Bureau; CC-EST2009-
6RACE-22; 2014 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates Public 
Use Microdata Samples, United States Census Bureau; CC-EST2015-
ALLDATA-22 
Definition: Estimated total of white regional residents divided by the estimated total 
of regional residents. Regional represents the parish with the greatest 
level of enrollment at the institution during the academic year.  
Variable: Regional Performance Score 
Variable Name: zreg_score 
Data Source & 
Tables: 
Louisiana Department of Education 
Definition: Regional school district performance score. Regional represents the 
parish with the greatest level of enrollment at the institution during the 
academic year. Standardized per academic year as measurement 
changed in 2012. 
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Appendix B: Supplemental Graphs 
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Appendix C: Supplemental Tables 
 
Supplemental Table 1: In-state Tuition & Fees for Louisiana Public Colleges in 2015 Inflation Adjusted Dollars 
Institution 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 % Change 
Baton Rouge Community College 1972 2081 2107 2607 2924 3145 3370 3693 87% 
Bossier Parish Community College 1938 2042 2109 2044 2738 2962 3296 3616 87% 
Capital Area Technical College 1052 1098 1124 1245 1553 1975 3140 3693 251% 
Central Louisiana Technical Community College 1009 1055 1082 1183 1522 1456 1449 1783 77% 
Delgado Community College 2143 2151 2680 3114 3438 3043 3306 3625 69% 
Fletcher Technical Community College 1629 1715 1765 2205 2655 2881 3246 3596 121% 
Grambling State University 3987 4203 4365 4666 5044 5365 5957 6525 64% 
Louisiana State University  5001 5619 5688 6073 6559 7111 7882 8750 75% 
Louisiana State University-Alexandria 3478 3735 3873 4021 4321 4697 5343 6009 73% 
Louisiana State University-Eunice 2439 2562 2500 2622 2831 2869 3202 3522 44% 
Louisiana State University-Shreveport 3875 3907 4058 4346 4639 5029 5613 6168 59% 
Louisiana Tech University 5039 5563 5674 5843 6087 6689 7311 8052 60% 
McNeese State University 3591 3781 3899 4201 4525 5177 5708 6334 76% 
Nicholls State University 3958 4034 4310 4522 4890 5778 6476 7234 83% 
Northshore Technical Community College 1008 1054 1080 1239 1999 2935 3270 3580 255% 
Northwest Louisiana Technical College 865 910 939 1182 1542 2300 2632 2566 197% 
Northwestern State University of Louisiana 3884 3975 4274 4619 5133 5576 6253 6786 75% 
Nunez Community College 1949 2053 2120 2156 2690 2925 3260 3590 84% 
River Parishes Community College 2063 2150 2189 2333 2552 2852 3236 3556 72% 
South Central Louisiana Technical College 843 888 1048 1151 1511 1934 2102 2414 186% 
South Louisiana Community College 2050 2139 2200 2373 2686 2911 3155 3581 75% 
Southeastern Louisiana University 3920 4111 4274 4215 4753 5333 5722 6547 67% 
Southern University and A & M College 4036 4315 4457 4830 5238 5913 6638 6630 64% 
Southern University at New Orleans 3270 3281 3339 3540 4032 4448 4856 4752 45% 
Southern University at Shreveport 2479 2561 2678 2877 3093 3362 3496 3634 47% 
SOWELA Technical Community College 1607 1670 1722 2431 2686 2921 3247 3662 128% 
University of Louisiana at Lafayette 3745 3948 4365 4664 5021 5468 6199 6872 83% 
University of Louisiana at Monroe 3971 4188 4145 4885 5266 5538 6325 6963 75% 
University of New Orleans 4386 4664 4693 5015 5383 5952 6586 7392 69% 
          
Source: Integrated Post-Secondary Data System 
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Supplemental Table 2: Two-Year Institutions Not Meeting Minimum GRAD Act Requirements  
Institution 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
       
Acadiana Technical College*       
Baton Rouge Community College      X 
Bossier Parish Community College       
Capital Area Technical College**       
Central Louisiana Technical Community College       
Delgado Community College       
Fletcher Technical Community College       
Louisiana Delta Community College       
Louisiana State University-Eunice  X     
Northeast Louisiana Technical College*       
Northshore Technical Community College       
Northwest Louisiana Technical College       
Nunez Community College       
River Parishes Community College       
South Central Louisiana Technical College       
South Louisiana Community College       
Southern University at Shreveport    X X X 
SOWELA Technical Community College       
        
Source: Louisiana Board of Regents 
             
*In 2013 Acadiana Technical College and Northeast Louisiana Technical College were merged with 
South Louisiana Community College and Louisiana Delta Community College, respectively so were not 
evaluated separately in 2013, 2014, 2015, & 2016. **In 2014 Capital Area Technical College merged with 
Baton Rouge Community College so was not evaluated separately in 2014, 2015, & 2016. 
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